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Abstract 
 
NATO is an Alliance of 26 nations that operates on a consensus basis, not a majority basis.  
Thorough and timely information exchange between nations is fundamental to the Business 
Process.  Current technology and practices at NATO HQ are inadequate to meet modern-day 
requirements despite the availability of demonstrated and accredited Cross-Domain technology 
solutions.  This lack of integration between networks is getting more complicated with time, as 
nations continue to invest in IT and ignore the requirements for inter-networked gateways.  This 
contributes to inefficiencies, fostering an atmosphere where shortcuts are taken in order to get 
the job done.  The author recommends that NATO HQ should improve its presence on the 
Internet, building on the desired tenets of availability and security.   
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Information Sharing Solutions for NATO Headquarters 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an Alliance of 26 member nations 
that operates on a consensus basis, rather than a majority basis, as found in most democratic 
countries or organizations (the United Nations for example).  The political Headquarters (HQ) of 
NATO is situated in Brussels, Belgium, where nations are represented by staffs of military and 
civilian specialists and diplomats.  Complete and rapid exchange of data between nations 
(through both their deployed representatives in Brussels and other representatives that reside at 
the national capitals) and NATO staff members, and amongst nations is critical to the Business 
Process at the HQ.  The ultimate goal is to build consensus and maintain the strength of the 
Alliance.  Although this statement is well understood by nations’ Ministries of Defense (MoDs), 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs), and National Representation at NATO HQ in Brussels, 
Belgium – there are still noticeable information exchange deficiencies, particularly evident now 
with the availability of modern Information Technology (IT).  If NATO and nations relied on the 
Internet, for example, they would be able to exchange email, develop policy material using wikis 
and web forums – not relying on real time interaction.  Even instant messaging could be used, 
but there would be time zone limitations, as National Representatives need to engage with their 
counter-parts resident in national capitals on a frequent and recurring basis.  However, the 
Internet would likely be found lacking adequate protection for some classified information 
sharing (“Common Security Vulnerabilities in e-commerce Systems”, n.d.).  NATO HQ needs to 
adopt technical solutions to enable information sharing on all networks. 
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A significant information exchange problem exists at NATO HQ detracting from the key 
business process of building consensus – and this can be mitigated through the use of available 
Cross-Domain technology solutions. 
The need for this project became evident during the author’s posting to NATO HQ in 
Brussels, employed in one nation’s Delegation during the period July 2003 to July 2007.  During 
this timeframe, the author challenged the issue of how the NATO HQ IT infrastructure was 
unable to contribute effectively to the business process.  It appeared as though modern IT was in 
place only to replace typing pools and secretarial resources, whereas the obvious advantages of 
powerful networking strategies were missing.  To be clear, the author’s responsibility was to a 
single nation, whereas nearly 1,000 personnel work at NATO HQ for the organization as a 
whole.  In a sense, the author was only a participant in the process and certainly not directly 
responsible for obtaining consensus.  The author experienced first-hand the frustration with 
antiquated cylinders of excellence, as many staff members described them, stove-piped special 
purpose single-nation networks.  NATO staff have considered the requirement for an 
overarching solution vis-à-vis Information Exchange Gateways (IEG) connecting the NATO 
classified domain with similar national domains (Diepstraten and Parker, 2003, p.1), but 
implementation of practical solutions are not forthcoming in the near term. 
This project starts with an explanation of the business process at NATO, why it is 
different than many organizations and why technological solutions need to be implemented 
without delay.  The paper will describe an existing information exchange problem and prescribe 
solutions based on research and literature review.  Due to the obvious need to protect classified 
information concerning NATO and national networks, detail will be limited to the same level as 
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what currently exists in the public domain (“North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, 2006). 
Obviously, standard office footprints are currently affected by the proliferation of stove-piped 
networks.  Some staff work in a single office where as many as five different networks are 
terminated.  The lack of integration between networks is getting more complicated with time, as 
nations continue to invest in IT and ignore the requirements for inter-networked gateways.  
There are current, tested and accredited solutions in existence, some meeting partial 
requirements, some potentially satisfying the full requirement, but as well, there have been 
complications in their installation and maintenance.  The use of HTTPS, for example, is an 
excellent example, and one that is in current use with banks.  However, this relies upon the basic 
existence, omnipresence and availability of the Internet, the assurance of which may not be 
sufficient for NATO’s requirements.  The past decades have seen several nations invest vast 
amounts of resources in the quest for true Multi-Level Security (MLS), but unfortunately, this 
technology is still not sufficiently mature for deployment.  In the conclusions, the author will 
summarize the results and make recommendations to adopt readily available technological 
solutions.  Finally, at the end of the paper, the back matter will include a glossary of terms and 
abbreviations, primarily NATO speak. 
Chapter 1 – Review of Literature and Research 
During the author’s tenure at NATO HQ, he gained first-hand experience with the 
business processes and use of technology in support of NATO and National staffs.  The 
experience he gained constituted primary research conducted through meetings, briefings, 
conferences and review of requirements and engineering documents covering the issue of 
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Information Exchange Gateways (IEG), not only at NATO HQ but also throughout the entire 
command structure.   
The attached Annotated Bibliography details a comprehensive literature review of 
sources available in the public domain.   Kriendler, a Professor of NATO and European Security 
Issues at the George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies, is a former member of the 
NATO International Staff.  His paper on NATO transformation is considered essential to confirm 
the De facto NATO business process of building consensus, prior to examining any potential 
technological solutions.  Several well-known authors have published books espousing the need 
for change, inspiring subsequent transformation of Command and Control processes and 
supporting technology advancement in many nations.  In particular, the authors Alberts, Gartska, 
Hayes, Signori, Atkinson and Moffat are well renowned experts in the area of network enabled 
information systems and their works have contributed to building the case for transformation, at 
Chapter 3.  Admittedly, there still remains a vast amount of information restricted in distribution, 
although this mostly deals with Multi-Level Security (MLS), and in particular, detailed network 
configuration and encryption methods – not determined necessary for this paper. 
While the ultimate goal will be one that supports MLS, one-way Data Diodes and cross-
domain technical security guard solutions currently exist and have been deployed by several 
nations.  Diepstraten and Parker, Principal scientists with NATO have written in open literature 
their views on obtaining network architecture constructs that build on the federation of networks, 
moving towards a reduction of stovepipes.  They are unbiased technical experts, recognized in 
their national environments (The Netherlands and The United States) for information system 
development, vulnerability analysis and integration projects.  The problem of connecting NATO 
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classified systems to National classified networks is not unique.  Some countries have already 
established limited bilateral solutions to satisfy unique requirements for information exchange, 
particularly in coalition operations.   They are often employed on a case-by-case basis (“Cross-
Domain Solutions”, n.d.).   
The Internet contains sufficient detail on military exercises, technology demonstrators 
and cooperative programs in the pursuit of improved interoperability amongst Allies.  Crocker, a 
General Dynamics Information Assurance Technical Lead, has cited definite limitations and 
recognizable flaws in continuing to pursue solutions that build on cross-domain technical 
security guards.  His work has helped to establish boundaries for Chapter 6, and the requirement 
to seek alternative solutions at Chapter 8.  Dr Reed, a Division Staff Engineer at the Mitre 
Corporation, has also produced works that help to define the construct of Security Guards for a 
future web environment. 
By drawing attention to the need for cross-domain solutions and improved formal 
networking, this paper should be of interest to NATO HQ staff and NATO member nations, 
reflecting on the potential added value to the business process. 
Chapter 2 – Business Process at NATO HQ 
As an organization, NATO was founded in 1949:  an Alliance of like minded nations 
committed to the high level security concepts of “democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law 
and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and promotes these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic 
area” (“North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Homepage”, n.d.).   NATO’s membership has 
grown in recent years to 26 nations, each with the same weight.  Why – with the same weight?  
As an Alliance, NATO is committed to reaching consensus on its policies, training and 
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operational activities.  Decision-making at NATO is founded on the principle of achieving 
consensus.  As a rule, voting does not occur where nations formally express their positions.  
Nations work together with the staff component of the HQ, and equally important, the 
representatives of other nations, in order to build consensus through dissemination of 
information and consultation.  “Consensus has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-
making in NATO since the creation of the Alliance” (“Consensus Decision Making at NATO - A 
Fundamental Principle”, n.d.).   
An informal network for achieving consultation has existed since 1949, not built with IT, 
but rather through the committee structure, a basis for consultation.  It starts with the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC).  Each nation has one representative at the NAC (an Ambassador), with 
the Secretary General acting as the Chairman.  NATO staff members work in administrative 
support of this highest-level committee producing agendas, publishing decision sheets, 
maintaining task lists and arranging for presenters.  All other committees, sub-committees, 
working groups and ad-hoc working groups follow a similar modus operandi.  In some cases, a 
NATO staff member will be the Chairman, and in other cases a nation may take on the 
responsibility.  The detail is irrelevant.  What is important to understand is the basic requirement 
to achieve consensus and the fact that nations and NATO staff members are deeply committed to 
the consultative process in order to be successful.   
At its most basic level, the consultative process involves “simply the exchange of 
information and opinions” (“The Consultation Process - Reaching Consensus”, n.d.).  All nations 
are represented at NATO HQ by Delegations; some are joint or combined Delegations that are 
comprised of military and diplomatic specialists, whereas some nations may use two separate 
   
   
Information Sharing Solutions   15 
 
 
 
entities, focusing on political or military affairs.  The two highest-level Committees are the NAC 
(as mentioned above) and the Military Committee (MC).  Therefore, each nation is at least 
represented at the NAC and the MC through an Ambassador and a Military Representative (a 
General Officer).  The process of consultation is continuous, and both formal and informal 
decision-making relies upon the on-site representation and availability of nations’ and NATO 
staffs.
The technological advances available to be utilized in support of networking and 
decision-making are something that is of interest to Alliances, like NATO, and equally to the 
understood asymmetric threat.  Unfortunately, concerns have been expressed that NATO may 
not be up to the challenge of timely decision-making.  Lord Robertson, a former Secretary-
General of NATO remarked, “…in an age where threats give little warning before they strike, 
NATO suffered from the perception in some circles that its consensual decision-making culture 
was too slow and cumbersome to deliver in time” (Robertson, 2004, p. 30).  There are essentially 
three elements to this term decision-making (Kriendler, 2005, p.7): 
1. The requirement to actually reach consensus (in some cases, this may not be 
possible due to national interests); 
2. The decision-making process at NATO HQ, including the necessary staff and 
administrative support that goes into the process (meetings, documents, 
presentations, witnesses, records, consultation); and 
3. Interagency processes in national capitals and the requisite democratic 
parliamentary activities that may take place (this is most often the case when a 
decision to employ forces is taken). 
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It is beyond the scope of this project to deal in particular with element 1, above, although 
technological solutions to support NATO’s business process are certainly available to directly 
support element 2, with follow-on support for elements 3 and 1.  Despite rumors to the contrary, 
“there is agreement by Allies that consensus decision-making will be preserved” (Kriendler, 
2005, p.9).  Deeply rooted in the business process at NATO is the silence procedure, a process 
that builds consensus through silence – an odd, but efficient concept.  The way it works is that 
nations are considered to agree to a policy, procedure or statement – when they do not break 
silence and speak against the issue (before the closure date/time).  Herein lays the importance of 
efficient, effective and thorough distribution and review of documents.  NATO clerical staff will 
initially distribute a draft document to nations through their delegations on-site in Brussels.  
Delegation staff will peruse the paper and when/if necessary transmit the document back to 
national experts in their capital to determine a national position on the subject.  It would be very 
difficult for on-site staff to competently develop national positions on these issues, since most 
often they become intricately entwined with national projects or operations.  Consider, for 
example, a NATO policy on when the Alliance should transition to IPv6 on networks.  
Delegation staff members must consult with their counterparts in the capitals, otherwise they 
may end up committing their nation to a policy that forces adoption of a protocol years in 
advance of when it is programmed by national project managers.   
Nations have the right to enact their own laws to define security classifications.  The US, 
for example, defines three levels at Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential (“Executive Order”, 
n.d.). In addition to these distinct classification levels, other terms like For Official Use Only, 
have gained common usage, at least in the USA.  Thirty years ago, NATO papers were just that – 
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papers.  National staff used the telephone and fax machines considerably more than today.  
However, times have changed and although nearly all official correspondence is still passed to 
nations on paper, there is more and more push of draft and official documents through internal 
email and file transfer over the MINERVA classified LAN (at NATO Secret).  To support this 
process is a Document Management System (DMS) in place at NATO HQ in Brussels - a 
Hummingbird application on MINERVA.  National clerical staff constantly receive a push of 
documents placed on the DMS.  Since there are air gaps between the NATO and national 
networks, emails and DMS documents must be extracted on removable media and inserted into 
the appropriate networks for onward distribution to national capitals. 
It would be extremely difficult to describe how each of the 26 nations makes contact with 
their capitals, and it would be equally hard to provide a pattern for a generic or average 
delegation.  However, it is a useful exercise, in support of this paper, to describe what means of 
connectivity a national delegation might have.  Recall that each nation is represented by both 
military (Ministry of Defense or MoD) and diplomatic staffs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs or 
MFA), or State Department – to use an American term.   
To visualize the networks in use, it is best to first start with the NATO networks.  NATO 
first deployed a Secret WAN in December 1995, responding to the needs of NATO’s first 
outside area operation in the history of the Alliance – IFOR (the Implementation Force in the 
Balkans).  This initial WAN is still in place today and permeates throughout the NATO 
command structure and is terminated at each nation’s capital with only two workstations.  Plans 
to introduce more workstations and/or interfaces to national networks will be discussed later.  A 
second network often commonly available in the capitals is the Battlefield Information 
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Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) – a WAN that shares intelligence data posted by the 
NATO plus nations that use it.  While most national capitals have only two NATO Secret (NS) 
WAN workstations, most have dozens of BICES workstations.  However, it would be poor 
practice for any nation to send its material describing draft national positions on either BICES or 
the NS WAN, until it became official.  It is important to understand that material available on 
either of these NATO systems is available for the use of all nations.   
Nations are likely to use whatever means they have at their disposal in order to transfer 
data back to their capitals.  The Internet, for example, is surely to be found in most delegations, 
but likely not pure Internet, but reachable through national gateways and firewalls from either a 
national defense or diplomatic network, one protected by web proxy servers and Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS).  Most nations will have to rely upon at least one national classified 
network in order to facilitate the consultation process with their capitals.  Figure 1 illustrates 
what networks might be found in a delegation, together with access to the NATO HQ classified 
network – MINERVA.  Networks available to the NATO staff members won’t include any 
national systems, but usually will include access to the Internet through a separate unclassified 
LAN.  Therefore, in the worst case, national representatives may have five networks terminated 
in their office and NATO staff members will likely have only one or two networks.   
MINERVA supports the business process.  A year ago, NATO staff made the startling 
discovery that 85% of MINERVA traffic was only at the NATO Restricted (NR) and below level 
(handled in the same manner as the USA treats For Official Use Only), far lower than what it is 
accredited for.  This statement is also likely valid for network traffic on the NS WAN, the only 
NATO WAN.  There is no other NATO WAN.  Therefore, there is no common email directory 
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or DNS structure in place to support an unclassified or NR WAN.  Users throughout the 
command structure rely on the NS WAN. 
 
BICES 
NATO SECRET NS WAN 
NATO HQ MINERVA 
NATO SECRET 
MINERVA 
MFA-S 
MoD-S MOD 
WAN 
SECRET 
MFA WAN 
SECRET 
MFA-U MoD-U
MFA WAN  
UNCLAS INTERNET MOD W
UNCLAS 
AN
Figure 1: Possible existing delegation networks in place at NATO HQ 
The staff at NATO HQ are fully aware of the networking challenges that lie ahead, not 
only for the HQ but nations as well.  In 2003, a capital project entitled Connectivity to Capitals 
resulted in some preliminary investigative work, principally in the area of how information is 
moved from NATO HQ back to the capitals.  However, even though this project never really 
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gained financial support, it did draw attention to the issue, but only from a one-sided perspective.  
It ignored the importance of the full business process - two-way communication, consultation.   
Thirty years ago, there was no evidence of a problem.  NATO and national staffs, 
resident in Brussels, worked very well with each other in the business process.  They discussed, 
considered and consulted together to achieve workable solutions.  The proliferation of IT 
networks, however, has made challenges for staff.  Security policies often prohibit the use of 
USB memory sticks, based on the large quantity of information that they can hold.  Any 
removable media that is used to extract unclassified information from a classified network 
cannot be reused in the higher network, once it has been used in the lower network.  Some 
systems are required to follow the Tempest standard (for limited electromagnetic emissions), 
tightening configuration changes and even printer assignments.  There is no certainty that the 
networks are using the same version of office software, or even the same operating system.  This 
presents user-training problems, increases the time required to move data across systems, results 
in no data logging – and contributes to an atmosphere of frustration and human error. 
The modern asymmetric threat demands much quicker decision-making.  Technology has 
enabled the quicker production, modification and dissemination of documents, but the 
networking process has seen little change, with the exception that data can move much faster 
back to national capitals.  The next logical step should see technological solutions utilized to 
reduce air-gaps, track data movement and improve the consultation and decision making process.   
Another area that may yet see change is the issue concerning the actual volume of 
classified traffic over the MINERVA network.  It seems unnecessarily resource expensive to 
utilize MINERVA with only 15% traffic classified at NATO Confidential (NC) and higher.  To 
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address this issue, in 2006, NATO staff announced plans to design a new Business LAN at 
NATO HQ to run in parallel with the MINERVA LAN.  Immediate benefits should be seen in 
designing, implementing and maintaining a LAN at the NR level vice the NS level – as well as 
reducing the traffic burden on the overworked MINERVA.   However, many nations countered 
that this will put one more workstation and one more air-gap on the desks of all staff – and it will 
result in a split information system.  The risk of a split database, with NC/NS material on 
MINERVA and NR (and below) material on the new Business LAN is currently being analyzed 
in Brussels and won’t be discussed further in this paper. 
NATO embarked on a major transformation with the declaration signed by all nations at 
the Prague Summit of November 2002 (“Prague Summit Declaration”, 2002).  Significant 
changes to the NATO Command Structure were announced; together with a comprehensive suite 
of measures intended to strengthen the Alliance’s ability to counter new threats, including those 
launched in cyber space.  Clearly, NATO understood the importance of change, getting away 
from a defense based on pre-determined strategic locations in Central Europe and posturing to 
best counter the asymmetric threat of terrorism.  The Prague Summit also built on the 
announcement at the Washington Summit of 1999 to build a new HQ “to meet the requirements 
of the Alliance in the 21  Century” (“NATO New Headquarters”, n.d.).  In fact, although it took 
time, this announcement has resulted in the allocation of an approved design and sufficient land, 
in order to achieve the desired end-state.  Current plans show that the new building, that will also 
mean new accommodation spaces not only for NATO staff but all national delegations as well – 
is aimed for occupancy in 2012.  If that goal is met, NATO will have an opportunity to step away 
st
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from its existing IT infrastructure, and build-in technological solutions to support its business 
process. 
Chapter 3 – Requirements for Transformation 
In the past decade, open sources abound with material touting the need for 
transformation, the need to leverage Information Age concepts and technologies and adapt 
business processes to make organizations much more agile and effective.  Terms like Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW), Network Enabled Capability (NEC) and Network Enabled Warfare 
(NEW) have emerged to describe how nations plan to embrace this concept and transform their 
forces.  A necessary goal of transformation is one described as self-synchronization, where an 
organization (Alberts and Hayes, 2005, p.27): 
a. Has clear and consistent understanding of the mission; 
b. Possesses high quality information and shared situational awareness; 
c. Shows competence at all levels; and 
d. Has trust in the information, equipment, technology, peers and higher/lower staff. 
It is true that marvelous advances in technology have changed our world, and 
immeasurably increased our capability to collect, process, disseminate, and utilize information.  
However, “despite considerable advances in our ability to process information, these advances 
have not been rapid enough to keep pace with the increases in collection…but help is on the 
way” (Alberts, Gartska, Hayes, and Signori, 2001, p.44). 
Readers familiar with the transformation concepts of the Information Age will recall that 
it is necessary to consider three domains: physical, information and cognitive (Alberts et al, 
2001, p.24).  The use of technology and changes in process and thinking are all required.  A 
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useful way to understand the value of this transformation is to consider the desired improved 
effectiveness of military forces.  The US DoD has embarked on a path of transformation, with 
notional expectations of the value to be gained.  Figure 2, below, is a familiar spider-chart that 
aims to map ten operational military values in a platform-based environment against a true 
network centric one (Alberts et al, 2001, p.69).  Although these are only assertions, the authors 
contest that growing evidence is being collected to support them. 
Improved 
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Figure 2:  Comparison of warfighting models 
When considering how to leverage the tenets of transformation, and strive for the benefits 
of self-synchronization, it is useful to start with the recognition of an existing informal network 
that has serviced the needs of the Alliance since its inception.  An informal network is a “human, 
social interaction based on trust, shared values, and beliefs, and allows the sharing of 
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information” (Atkinson and Moffat, 2005, p.89).  Together with the formal process of policy 
writing and document exchange, this informal network between nations and NATO staff 
members still serves the Alliance business process of consultation, even today.   
The Industrial Age saw the evolution of military forces into “many-layered hierarchies 
populated with stove-piped organizations and centralized planning processes” (Alberts and 
Hayes, 2005, p.57).  The latter half of the 20th century was characterized by the introduction of 
digital networks and information systems dedicated to supporting these stove-pipes, or cylinders 
of excellence.  However, with the requirement for coalition warfare and renewed interest in 
interoperability, breaking apart these stove-pipes and building gateways between networks has 
become more and more essential.  So important, in fact, that one quickly comes to the realization 
that the benefits of transformation entirely depends on the interconnection of networks, within or 
between nations.  Despite the advances of the Internet and the development of open source 
protocols (which has made multi-domain collaboration a reality), the lack of interoperation 
between domain access control policies may lead to breaches in security (Shehab, Bertino, and 
Ghafoor, 2005). 
The Chief Information Officer (CIO) for the Australian Defence Forces commented that 
new capabilities are being developed to allow sharing of classified information electronically 
between allied partners.  Up until recently, “the only means to exchange messages of this 
classification was through the text-based formal messaging system” (O'Sullivan, 2005).  A 
recently established alternative, is the US led Combined Enterprise Regional Information 
Exchange System (CENTRIXS) suite of networks supporting information sharing at the 
operational and tactical levels.  A unique CENTRIXS domain is established to meet the 
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requirements of each coalition group, led by US Forces.  In time, these different domains may 
also be inter-connected with gateways.   
Beyond the initial gateway between networks, there are many other obstacles to 
achieving full C2 interoperability, namely (Larsen, 2007): 
a. Coherent doctrine and procedures; 
b. Physical connection; 
c. Compatible protocols; 
d. Compatible or like data structures; 
e. Semantic understanding of data; and 
f. Information assurance. 
However, Larsen did not mention two significant hurdles to cross-domain solutions, 
namely trust between nations and nations’ capacity for embracing technological change.  Trust 
between nations is a difficult factor to measure.  Consider, for example, that all NATO nations 
standardized on exactly the same security classifications – which is not actually the case since 
nations make these definitions themselves.  Suppose, for example, that Nation X wanted to 
connect its classified network to a like network operated by Nation Y, particularly important to 
both nations involved in the same coalition operation.  One problem that involves the 
consideration of trust is the process of obtaining and maintaining a security clearance.  Suppose 
that Nation X requires a thorough background study and several months of investigation in order 
to grant a national Secret clearance.  What if Nation Y does not put the same level of effort into 
the background check and gives out a Secret clearance after no investigative work at all?  This is 
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clearly an area where both nations have to be completely honest when establishing their level of 
trust.   
In an NCW environment, rather than relying upon traditional data push or pull 
technologies, the concept of discovery has emerged as important enabler.  “Discovery 
generically refers to finding and retrieving actionable, decision-quality information on-the-fly” 
(Connors, Malloy, and Masek, 2006, p. 3).  One could easily argue that the discovery process 
will never happen as long as there are air-gaps between networks.  Similarly, even basic services 
like web browsing and email depend on an arrangement of mutual, pre-scripted trust between 
nations, embodied in their security policies.   
The situation at NATO HQ is a relatively simple one, with a well-defined Alliance of 26 
nations.  This is not a dynamic coalition with partner nations, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) (Red Cross and Doctors without Borders, for example) and Other Government 
Departments (Coastguard, for example) drifting in and out over time.  Information sharing and 
security in dynamic coalitions is considerably more difficult, particularly when trying to enable 
joint C2 services, well beyond the basics of email and web browsing (Phillips, Ting, and 
Demurjian, 2002). 
Since NATO membership now includes 26 nations, it is relevant to comment on the 
potential for improving interoperability, given the effort that may be required on the part of all 
nations.  The diversity of NATO's member nations is reflected in their geographic size, location, 
population demographics, levels of economic development, types of governments, and capacity 
for acquiring high technology.  Acquisition of new technologies seems to be unproblematic.   
The increasing use of open standards and cross industry collaboration has nearly eliminated the 
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problem, but the capacity to acquire a technology does not necessarily equate to a comparable 
capacity to implement it.  Implementation requires a subsequent threshold level of physical, 
human, and institutional capacity, taking into account financial resources, social, political, and 
even cultural will. 
A study by the RAND Corporation has suggested that the impact of interoperability and 
technology adoption varies widely across global regions and nations (Silberglitt, AntÃ³n, 
Howell, and Wong, 2006).   Each country's capacity to implement new technologies was 
considered at Figure 3, taking into account the following factors:  
a. Capacity to acquire; 
b. The percentage of the ten drivers for implementation applicable to that country; and  
c. The percentage of the ten barriers to implementation applicable to that country. 
Implementation drivers and/or barriers that were considered were (Silberglitt et al 2006): 
a. Cost/financing; 
b. Laws/policies; 
c. Social values, public opinions, politics; 
d. Infrastructure; 
e. Privacy concerns; 
f. Resource use and environmental health; 
g. Investment in research and development; 
h. Education and literacy; 
i. Population and demographics; and  
j. Governance and stability. 
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Figure 3:  Selected Countries Capacity to Implement Technology 
 
 Business processes at NATO HQ need to be transformed.  This transformation should 
start with the connection of classified networks, NATO and national, to the extent possible – 
given nations’ will, trust and capacity to embrace the solutions available.  NATO member 
nations will be “on their own recognizance” when it comes to implementation.  The use of the 
Internet may also be considered, given the known limitations for security.  The Internet is nearly 
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omni-present, and may play an important role.  There may be drivers or barriers that come to 
play, certainly impacting on the Alliance as a whole.  
Chapter 4 – Changing the Office Footprint 
Typical government offices are organized into a cubicle environment.  Although this 
contributes to an efficient and economical workspace, it goes against good practice when 
considering the different networks, classified telephone and personal conversations and security 
controls that are usually required.  Typically, national and NATO staffs are not housed in 
bullpens or cubicles, perhaps two personnel to an office.  This makes a significant difference 
when considering the issue of required separation distance between network equipment.  There is 
usually a requirement for a physical separation, even between unclassified and classified 
networks operated by the same nation.  Normally, the 1 metre rule is in effect.  Network 
equipment, telephones, fax machines, modems, hubs, routers, servers, keyboards and even 
printers – are required to be at least 1 metre separate from hardware belonging to another 
network.  This can present challenges, even within an office occupied by only one staff member. 
There is likely to be a modest energy saving to be found in incorporating gateways or 
cross-domain solutions between networks.  To get an idea of what this might represent, assume 
the electrical current draw of an average personal computer (PC) as 2.5A (at 120V), and the 
monitor at 1.0A (ignoring the energy demands of printers, servers and network appliances).  An 
estimated 3,000 personnel work at NATO HQ.  Based on the author’s experience, this can be 
broken out into roughly 1,000 NATO staff, 600 NATO Agency staff, 1,200 National staff and 
200 from the Partner Nations.  NATO staff don’t need cross-domain solutions.  Their needs can 
likely be met with two computers, one for unclassified and the other for classified (currently 
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MINERVA).  The real customer base for cross-domain solutions will be with the national 
delegations.  Based on work in the previous chapter to describe a generic delegation, one might 
safely assume that three computers are in use per person amongst the 1,200 national staff.  This 
could certainly be reduced to two computers, one at the unclassified level and the other at the 
classified level.  Reducing the footprint of 1,200 computers would show an obvious reduction of 
4,200A (504KW) throughout the building during the daytime.  This will represent a considerable 
reduction in electrical demand over the building’s power infrastructure.   Over a 10-hour day, 
this equates to a savings of only $ 403 per day – spread across 26 nations (based on 8 cents per 
KW hour).  Over a 220-day work year, this savings corresponds to nearly $ 89K.   
Admittedly, the financial impact of reducing stove-piped networks seems trivial.  
However, there are also potential impacts with a reduced demand for air-conditioning in the 
summer, and less ambient noise.  The background noise in a small office with only one computer 
is noticeably less than another office with three or four computers.  Another simple calculation 
could see a reduction in the cost of baseline software, both initial licensing and ongoing 
maintenance costs.  There could also be a reduced training burden, reflected in lower costs to the 
nations and improved efficiency and morale of their staff. 
The existing air-gap method of data transfer is not without its shortcomings (“A Preferred 
Solution For High-Security Real-time Electronic Data Transfer Between Networks”, n.d.).   Data 
extracted from MINERVA to a national network (unclassified or classified) has to be copied to a 
removable storage medium, then physically moved and placed in another network.  One might 
naively assume that options available to the staff are floppy disk, CD, DVD, zip drive or even 
USB stick.  However, security policies will vary in their treatment of this.  It may even be 
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possible that one or more of the receiving networks is closed to any removable media.  
According to NATO security policy, any previously used media is not permitted to be inserted in 
MINERVA (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2006), due to the risk of contamination from 
malicious code.  The continuous process of moving data across air-gaps requires a considerable 
amount of time, effort and expense.  Although the ongoing cost of having fresh CDs available 
may appear trivial, some personnel are required to buy, store and dispense or manage this 
material.  Consider the impact of these air-gaps present in all 26 NATO nations’ delegations.  
Based on the author’s experience, on average, 80 official documents were transferred daily by 
registry staff in one delegation.  However, most of the previously mentioned 1200 national staff 
are consumed with transferring these formal documents (in addition to informal correspondence 
and draft documents) and receiving replies constituting national positions on a daily basis.  
Globally, this clearly represents a high risk.  A manual transfer of material is not conducive to 
automation or remote operation, although the use of data diodes, to be discussed in the next 
chapter, may prove to be of value.  Needless to say, all of this cross-domain data transfer is 
currently done in private offices, with no logging of what material has been moved where – 
contrary to well established good practice in the handling of classified material. 
Reducing air-gaps between networks isn’t going to save a lot of money, but the 
inefficiencies and lack of control inherent with the existing manual transfers can definitely 
benefit from automation and logging.  This will have a follow-on effect with the result being 
more efficient staff, and faster, more thorough consultation - something that is in line with 
NATO’s stated ambitions. 
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Chapter 5 – Data Diodes 
Some of the inherent weaknesses of air-gap cross-domain solutions were already 
mentioned in the previous chapter.  Although the waste of resources is of concern, even more 
alarming is the lack of control and potential risky security environment.  Removable media (used 
for the manual air-gaps) can be lost, improperly labelled, improperly stored, and accidentally 
disposed off – all contributing to a relaxed handling environment where classified information 
may end up in the wrong hands.  An obvious improvement can be through the use of an 
automated process, a technological solution.  “The physical one-way nature of the Data Diode 
insures that no administrator, encryption hacker, computer hardware expert, locksmith or 
untrained employee can move data from the inside network out” (“Multi-Domain Security and 
its Impact on Network Centric Operations”, n.d., p.4).  Typically, the higher classified network is 
prohibited from connection with a lower classified network.  In this application involving the 
movement of NATO HQ produced documents, it will be assumed that MINERVA (classified at 
NS) will be the lower network and one (or several) of the national networks (classified as 
national secret) may function as the higher network. With this configuration, a Data Diode 
installation may control and log the one-way transfer of files, email and even web pages.  There 
are different commercial products marketed as Data Diodes, and the following pages will present 
and discuss two variants.  
The Fort Fox Data Diode is a hardware-based security device, designed to optically 
insulate two domains/networks.  This technology has been installed in several countries, 
including within NATO networks to provide a secure one-way connection without 
compromising the security of the receiving network.  The device operates in a unidirectional 
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mode, deploying a gigabit-speed light source and receiving photocell (“A Preferred Solution For 
High-Security Real-time Electronic Data Transfer Between Networks”, n.d.).  The Data Diode 
can be installed on its own, or together with two optional servers to provide additional features.  
A simplified configuration is shown below as Figure 4. 
 
 
 
MINERVA Secret 
National Secret Network 
Figure 4: Typical Fort Fox Data Diode Configuration (“A Preferred Solution For High 
Security Real-time Electronic Data Transfer Between Networks”, n.d.).   
 
With this installation, the black network will be MINERVA and the red network will be a 
national network (at the Secret level).  Both red and black servers come with web interfaces, 
allowing authorized users to define and carry out data transfers, on a case-by-case basis – if 
required.  National network users can access automated transfer of files from MINERVA, email 
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sent from MINERVA to national users, and even browse down into MINERVA web pages.  The 
process for file transfers or email is fully automated after configuration of both the black and red 
proxy servers. There is no need for ongoing operator intervention, unless changes are required to 
the configuration.  The black proxy server, for example, could be set to move all NATO DMS 
files as they are produced and saved to the DMS.  The black proxy server automatically forwards 
data through the Data Diode to the red proxy server, and then forwards it to the final destination 
in the red network. To users in the black network it appears as if they can send a file or email 
straight to a server or recipient in the red network. However, network traffic is strictly limited to 
go only from the black to the red network; in fact it is physically impossible to send information 
from red to black with this Data Diode installation (Rens de Wolf, personal communication 21 
January 2008). 
The physical connection between the red and black networks relies on the optical 
junction of the Data Diode.  Data leakage from errors or holes in software or firmware in the 
Data Diode is not possible, simply because there is no decision logic present in the device.  All 
data that moves across the diode is logged on both the black and red servers, “ensuring that all 
‘events’ during a transfer are tracked and timed, and abnormal activities are detected and 
reported” (“A Preferred Solution For High-Security Real-time Electronic Data Transfer Between 
Networks”, n.d., p.11).   The throughput of the optical Data Diode is designed as 1 Gbit/s, and its 
level of security has been approved by the Dutch information security accreditation body. 
Fox-IT is working on a two-way Data Diode. This "diode" will still have the same 
features as the existing Fort Fox Data Diode, but will also allow pre-defined and digitally signed 
information to go the other way, from the red network backwards into the black network. This 
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would allow people in the red network to not only receive emails from the black network, but 
also reply - by having it digitally signed by the user and vetted by an authorized supervisor 
(before the information is allowed to leave the red network).  In addition, a comprehensive audit 
trail is expected to be part of the solution. As this is currently still a development project, no final 
documentation is available to the public (Rens de Wolf, personal communication 21 January 
2008). 
The Tenix America Interactive Link Data Diode (IL-DD)  “uses a systems architecture 
and solutions approach that allows military, intelligence and homeland security organizations to 
analyze and share data safely across classified and unclassified networks” (“Press Release – 
Accreditation of Email Transfer and Data Forwarding Applications Results in Complete Turn-
Key Cross Domain Solution”, n.d.).  The Tenix 100MB Data Diode has received full Director of 
Central Intelligence Directives (DCID) accreditation.  The installation and expected use of the 
Tenix Data Diode is similar to the Fox-IT product previously described.  The Tenix Data Diode 
is a 100MB fiber optic hardware device, connected between two servers installed in respective 
security domains.  Tenix data pump applications installed on these servers can be configured to 
provide (“Tenix Data Diode – Absolute Information Protection”, n.d.): 
a. One-way SMTP email transfer; 
b. One-way file transfer (any size); 
c. One-way transfer of IP packets; and 
d. One-way transfer of clipboard data. 
 
Although a turn-key solution can be provided by Tenix, the device requires servers using 
operating systems that have been tested and found to be supportive of the security device.  Third 
party email content filters and virus scanning applications may be chosen by the purchaser, for 
the purpose of screening for malicious code prior to entering the high network.  Figure 5 
   
   
Information Sharing Solutions   36 
 
 
 
illustrates how one-way email transfer is supported with the addition of servers installed on both 
domains.  The Email Transfer Application (ETA) interfaces with SMTP mail servers to allow 
email produced on the low network to flow into the high network.   
 
 
 
National Secret 
MINERVA Secret 
Figure 5:  Tenix Data Diode Email transfer (“Tenix Data Diode – Absolute Information 
Protection”, n.d.): 
 
Files placed into a specific source directory on MINERVA would be automatically 
transferred to the National Secret network, and of course filtered for malicious content and 
logged.  Streaming video, audio and sensor data can also be moved across this IL-DD.  NATO 
HQ uses video production equipment to record meetings of the NAC and MC.  Using the one-
way feature of this product, live streaming video could be moved from MINERVA onto a 
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national network, for viewing by either on-site delegation staff, or even remote staff in a nation’s 
capital. 
An additional feature found with the Tenix IL-DD is the clipboard and file transfer.  This 
Tenix application interfaces with a session’s operating system clipboard so that a user can easily 
find and transfer text, images and files seamlessly, in accordance with preset rules.  The 
configuration may be adjusted, for example, to only permit only certain file types.  Users are 
given an easy to use drop box, allowing them to drag and drop items selected for transfer from 
the low to high network – while still producing extensive audit and trace logging.  The Canadian 
Department of National Defence has specified the use of the Tenix IL-DD, complete with email, 
file and clipboard transfer for one-way movement of data from an unclassified domain up to two 
different classified domains (Thuppal, October 2007).  In this specification, the Tenix Interactive 
Link Keyboard Switch (IL-KBS) is described, where users can access two separate networks 
from a single workstation, using thin client technology to actually display the less secure 
network in a window on the higher domain’s PC.  Users can access email, web and public 
networks without compromising security, removing the procurement and running costs 
associated with the second PC. 
Although the features available with Data Diodes sound very promising, the raison d’être 
of this paper is to reduce the number of air-gaps used at NATO HQ.  Whilst the installation of 
Data Diodes would certainly save staff time, improve the security situation, and provide an audit 
trail for the movement of data from MINERVA to one or more national networks – it is only 
one-way, and does not fully replace the existing sneaker-nets in use.  Delegation staff are still 
interested in getting national positions (often scripted in the capital) from the national network 
   
   
Information Sharing Solutions   38 
 
 
 
onto MINERVA for onward dissemination in the HQ itself – fulfilling the business process of 
consultation.  Data Diodes fall short of satisfying this requirement. 
Chapter 6 – Cross-Domain Security Guards 
Corporations and organizations with different networks in use, at some point in time, will 
need to consider the benefits of inter-connecting different security domains.  A security domain 
is “An environment or context that is defined by a security policy, security model, or security 
architecture to include a set of system resources and the set of system entities that have the right 
to access the resources” (“RFC 2828”, n.d.).  In the simplest of cases, where one company buys 
out another, this exercise can be a trivial one, particularly if both networks are owned by the 
same organization. In this case, it may only require adjustments to router settings, or adjustments 
to the configuration of a firewall separating the two networks.   However, in more complex 
cases, such as the one described in this paper at NATO HQ, even if all networks operate at the 
same classification, challenges will be evident.   
The strategic level NATO Security Policy comprises two comprehensive documents that 
describe high-level policy at NATO fixed and deployed or operational sites.  In detail, it is 
supported through six security directives that describe policy as it relates to Personnel Security, 
Physical Security, Security of Information, Industrial Security and two volumes that detail 
Information Security (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2006).  Security policy should 
comprise a comprehensive set of essential security features, assurances and practices that result 
in four important functions in an organization (Whitman et al, 2005, p. 68): 
a.   Protection of the organizations functionality; 
b.  Enabling the safe operation of software applications; 
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c.   Protection of corporate data that is stored, manipulated and transmitted; and 
d.  Protection of investment in corporate IT equipment. 
The NATO HQ MINERVA LAN is operated as a system high network.  That is to say, 
that all personnel certified to use the network are cleared to the NS level.  All data is assumed to 
be Secret, therefore, personnel must be cleared to this level.  Within such an environment, it is 
accepted that some users, despite the fact that they have a valid security clearance, may not have 
a need to know some data.  If the originators of such data want to take precautions, the onus is on 
them to craft suitable file sharing permissions – and this can become particularly tedious in a 
large organization.  The advantage of such a system high network is that it becomes easier to use 
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) components (MacMillan, Shimko, Sellers, Mayer, Wilson, 
2006).  The downside of a system high network is that it must be kept strictly separated, isolated, 
for example from a Top Secret domain.  Nonetheless, this sets the stage for the basic security 
guard, between two classified domains, operating at the same level.  Traditional Security Guards 
have typically been used to control the flow of information between different security domains.  
Firewalls are able to perform some of the required functionality of a Security Guard, since they 
are able to control connections based on source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, 
communications protocols and sometimes user ID and authentication.  A Security Guard, 
however, controls the content sent over a particular connection.  Figure 6, on the following page 
depicts this basic system high, guarded architecture. 
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NATO Secret 
MINERVA 
Figure 6: System High, Guarded Architecture
Guard
National Secret 
LAN / WAN 
The purpose of this simple guard is to control the flow of information between the two 
different security domains in accordance with pre-determined information sharing rules.  A rule 
could, for example, specify one-way transit of information, from MINERVA to the National 
LAN – with no return path (just as what you achieve with a Data Diode).  Rules are primarily 
established with the intention of protecting both security domains (or even more domains in a 
complicated scenario) from unauthorized intrusion and denial of service attacks that could result 
from the presence of the interface.  Security Guards have also been referred to as Cross Domain 
Solutions (CDS) or Controlled Interfaces depending on the author and product.  Regardless of 
the nomenclature, Security Guards are known to possess a number of characteristics that define 
them (Reed, 2004, p. 1-3): 
a. The type of data that can be passed.  Some guards only support transfer of highly 
structured text; while others support transfer of unstructured or semi-structured data. 
b. The method used to check the content of items.  Some guards rely on human 
review of all data content; some use an automated review, and some bump the review 
to a human only when it fails to pass through a dirty word filter. 
c. The direction of the data flow.  Some guards are designed to transfer data from a 
lower classified domain to a higher one.  In this case, the guard will be focused on the 
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risk of allowing malicious content into the higher domain.  Some guards work to filter 
information moving from a higher to lower classified domain, and in this case, will be 
concerned with unauthorized data release.  Some guards support bi-directional flow, 
whereas some are uni-directional. Some guards transfer data between equivalent 
peers, focusing their effort on checking for both malicious content and the 
unauthorized release of data.   
d. The delivery method used to transfer the data.  Some guards use File Transport 
Protocol (FTP), some use Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP); some use 
Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP); some use other protocols. 
In the case of a National interface to the MINERVA network, one can easily imagine the 
requirement for two-way email and at least one-way web browsing.  Given the business process 
in place, staff working at the grand strategic level of NATO definitely need full two-way email 
(with certain attachments).  One-way browsing would mean that National staff could browse into 
MINERVA, but other nations or NATO staff would be unable to browse across into the National 
network.  Figure 7, below, illustrates the minimum required functional data flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MINERVA 
NS LAN 
Data Flows: 
• Directory Services 
• File Transfer 
• Web (one-way) 
• Email with attachments
National 
Classified 
Network 
Figure 7:  Required Functional Data Flows 
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In an operational or tactical theatre, one can easily imagine other required data flows in 
order to increase the synergy of coalition forces, services like Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VOIP), Video Teleconference (VTC), instant messaging / chat and Joint Common Operational 
Picture (JCOP) combining the Land/Air/Maritime views.  However, NATO HQ is a political 
organization and frankly does not need these additional services, cutting into the responsibility of 
other operational HQs.  However, supporting even limited services can present challenges.  Even 
with one-way web browsing, “vulnerabilities associated with Web technologies introduce risks” 
(Reed, 2004, p. 18).  Poorly written web pages have been known to result in cross-site request 
forgery, cross-site scripting, SQL injection, buffer overflows, remote command execution, and 
weak authentication and authorization (“Common Security Vulnerabilities in e-commerce 
Systems”, n.d.).  Even with one-way browsing, an element of trust between the organizations 
responsible for networks will be required.   
Expanding on the functional view of Figure 7, one can realize how these services need to 
be allocated into two general areas providing Boundary Protection Services (BPS) and a 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).  The BPS should provide basic routing / traffic filtering so that IP 
traffic will follow the defined security policy rules.  It might, for example, be desired to limit 
accessibility of MINERVA data to only those users originating at National Delegations resident 
at NATO HQ, denying this connectivity to the thousands of other legitimate users who are 
employed elsewhere.  This is also where browsing from MINERVA users into the National 
Classified Network would be stopped.  Intrusion Detection System (IDS) network sensors would 
normally be placed in the BPS.  Next to consider will be the issue of encryption requirements (if 
any) of the networks as they are distributed throughout the building. Classified networks within 
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Delegations would not normally require encryption (because the physical space is controlled by 
the Delegation).  Cabling, as such, would be described as RED (unencrypted) since they carry 
classified, unencrypted traffic.   However, once the cables move outside the physical control of 
nations, into the common corridors at NATO HQ, there will likely be a demand for an encryption 
device (at each end) to provide sufficient protection for the network (likely operating at Layer 2 
of the ISO model).  These concepts are illustrated below in Figure 8, introducing the subsequent 
problems of ownership of the DMZ and BPS components, physical placement and consequential 
configuration control.  At this point in time, it should suffice to realize that a joint or cooperative 
effort may not be satisfactory to both NATO and National authorities, and that each party may 
need to install and operate their own components.  The NATO solution of cooperative zones will 
be discussed in a later chapter. 
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server (one-way browsing 
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 Figure 8:  Required Functional Separation of DMZ and BPS 
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Translating the functional components described at Figure 8 into equipment resources 
results in a more mature depiction of the required CDS depicted below at Figure 9.  
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Figure 9:  Equipment requirements for the CDS 
If you start with the assumption that you need to create a system high network (a Secret 
network, for example – that contains data that is also classified at lower levels), you’ll need to 
build on an architecture that is accredited for the highest level of data held.  In the long run, this 
solution is less costly in terms of resources, simply because it guards all data the same and avoids 
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the high cost of human review – something that may be necessary downstream when connections 
to lower networks are required (“Cross Domain Solutions”, n.d.).  The importance that the 
underlying server operating system holds is “undeniable, the underlying operating system is 
responsible for protecting application-space mechanisms against tampering, bypassing and 
spoofing attacks” (Loscocco, Smalley, Muckelbauer, Taylor, Turner, and Farrel, 1998, p. 1).  In 
addition to the robustness of the operating system, residual technical problems, incorrect 
installations and implementation and erroneous assumptions are often to blame for resultant 
vulnerabilities.   
A foundation for modern cross-domain Security guards has come to be the BAE XTS-
300 and the Secure Trusted Operating System (STOP) - collectively referred to as the Defense 
Information Infrastructure (DII) High Assurance Guard (“Integrated Information Assurance - 
XTS 300 Solution Suite”, n.d.).  An XTS-300 hosting the DataSync Guard application offers 
web browsing, email with attachments, directory sharing and secure message transfers between 
the two domains.  The BAE XTS-300 is touted as a Multi-Level System, originally developed by 
BAE Systems, and has transitioned from proprietary, mini-computer hardware to COTS 
hardware. The XTS-300 completed security evaluation in 1994 and is (or has been) in common 
use in CDS for up to Secret level, with example installations as follows (“XTS-400 -  BAE 
Systems”, n.d.): 
a. National Security Agency’s (NSA) DII Guard; 
b. Defense Information System Agency’s (DISA) C2 Guard; 
c. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Cyclone Guard; 
d. State Department’s Unclassified Telegram Guard Processor; 
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e. Air Force’s F-22 Secure Interface System; 
f. Department of Energy’s FTP Guard; 
g. Novell Corporation’s NICI Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); 
h. United States Intelligence Community; and 
i. Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Industry and Trade (DFAIT). 
The DII High Assurance Guard is now being superseded by the next generation, the 
XTS-400, a combination of Intel x86 hardware and STOP.   The latest version of STOP, version 
6, uses an Intel construct referred to as exclusive domains of isolation.  For example, Domain 0 
(the security kernel) has the system’s highest level of security, inaccessible to users.  Inside 
Domain 0, I/O drivers reside, secure from unauthorized access.  Processes are also restricted by 
Domain privileges, and are not allowed to send messages to higher Domains.  The XTS-400 can 
host, and be trusted to separate multiple and concurrent data sets, users and networks at different 
sensitivity levels and meets the Common Criteria assurance level rating of Evaluation Assurance 
Level (EAL) 5 (although designed to meet the stringent requirements of EAL6).  Of note, there 
are 11 incremental differences between EAL4 and 5, and an additional 13 differences between 
EAL5 and 6 (“XTS-400 - BAE Systems”, n.d.).  EAL4 is used where developers or users require 
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventionally produced operating 
systems and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs (“Common 
Criteria – An Introduction”, n.d.).  For example, Windows 2000 and Solaris 8 are evaluated at 
EAL4 (“Trusted Solaris 8 Operating Environment”, n.d.).  EAL5, on the other hand, is applicable 
in “circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured 
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security” (“XTS-400 – BAE Systems”, n.d.).  Version 6 of STOP incorporates Mandatory 
Integrity Policy (users are able to read the files they need, while the files remain protected from 
unauthorized modification or malicious code) and Discretionary Access Controls (users set 
permissions based on recipients in Access Control Lists (ACL)). 
In a Trusted Guard configuration, the XTS-400 is intended to host the Standard 
Automated Guard Environment (SAGE), a client/server, modular, transaction-oriented 
infrastructure.  Not surprisingly, detailed examples of Trusted Guard CDS installations are not 
commonly available in the public domain. The Canadian Department of Defence has specified 
the use of BAE’s new DII Guard (XTS-400 and STOP 6) for a CDS between three classified 
networks operating with different release caveats, hence different domains.  The CDS will 
support email and web browsing between the domains, all at the Secret level (Thuppal, 
December 2007).  The number of networks that could be connected is limited primarily by the 
port limitation of hardware interfaces and server processing power (R. Thuppal, personal 
communication 27 January 2008).  BAE-IT offers to help design, code and accredit Trusted 
Guard CDS, a feature that should be of interest to nations seeking to reduce stove-piped 
networks at NATO HQ. 
Other examples of certified CDS are available within the public domain.  Some examples 
are as follow: 
a. Radiant Mercury - developed by Lockheed Martin.  The CENTRIXS network 
already makes use of the Radiant Mercury CDS with one-way browsing and two-way 
email/chat/collaboration between SIPRNet and each CENTRIXS variant (essentially 
bilateral relationships between the USA and each member of the particular coalition).  
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Radiant Mercury guards are specifically used within CENTRIXS “for formatted 
message text data and imagery” (Boardman and Shuey, 2004).  
b. Clearswift - a United Kingdom (UK) provider of CDS, accredited to EAL4 standard. 
Two products are of interest to this chapter: BastionTM (providing assured separation 
of networks operating at different levels of trust), and DeepSecureTM (providing 
assured network boundary protection and inspected of encrypted emails).  Clearswift 
claims (with confidence to EAL4) that with their CDS, an electronic air-gap with 
automated content inspection provides much higher security than a conventional air-
gap (due to the human involvement in moving the media across the network gap) 
(“EAL4 accredited solutions for military, defense and intelligence security”, n.d.).   
c. Sentinel Trusted CDS – produced by Nexor (of the UK), a producer of high-grade 
security products and services for defense and government.  Sentinel is compliant to 
EAL5 (“NATO Awards Nexor Contract for Provision of High Assurance 
Mailguards”, n.d.).     
d. Secure Office – developed by Trusted Computer Systems and built on a Linux server 
platform - is the first secure Linux operating system to enter evaluation at EAL4 
(“SecureOffice Trusted Gateway on Linux”, n.d.).  Secure Office builds upon the 
Trusted Gateway System (TGS), fielded and operational for more than ten years.  
This solution can be used with Unix thin clients, or on Windows 2000 or above.  It is 
not limited to any arbitrary combination of networks (could be used as 26:1 with 
NATO HQ for example), and provides secure, multi-directional data transfer using a 
graphical, web-based client interface.  It has options for dirty word search and two-
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person review (originator and reviewer) when moving data from a higher to lower 
classification.  Users are able to request data movement in any direction, based on 
their security clearance, site security policies and user access rights.  
Crocker, a General Dynamics Information Assurance Technical Lead, labels CDS as 
legacy technology, citing its limited but recognizable flaws.  In the simplest terms, a CDS 
confirms the authorized downgrading of information (when moving from a higher to lower 
network) and that no malicious code is able to transit the networks.  Unfortunately, they are 
programmed to be able to work with only specific data types, and rigidly apply a pre-ordained 
set of rules.  In reality, they do nothing to mitigate the risks posed by insiders (Crocker, 2007) – 
often attributed to 95% of losses (“CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey”, 2006).   A 
CDS still demands accurate labeling and handling by the user community, both at the point of 
production and onward dissemination and distribution.  Information that has been incorrectly 
labeled by the originator, or skillfully adjusted to be successful in passing through the content 
filter will not be detected, deleted and/or quarantined by the CDS.  This paper, for example, may 
not pass through a CDS simply because it has used the phrase Top Secret.  Although the material 
itself does not warrant this classification, the CDS will prevent its release from a Secret network 
down to an unclassified network, simply because of the rigid rule to detect and deny any data 
transfer containing this phrase.  Most content filters are limited in their ability to screen 
attachments.  Parsing a text file attachment for the phrase “National Eyes Only” is fairly easy, 
but will become a much more challenging task with a .jpg image and practically impossible with 
steganography (the action of hiding the existence of data/information, as well as the actual data 
itself, concealed within other innocuous data, in plain view) (Whitman et al, 2005, p. 385). 
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As discussed, the downside of typical CDS is that content checkers may be too rigid 
(inhibiting information sharing) in their enforcement of the cross-domain security policy.  
Alternatively, they may be too permissive and unable to step back and completely realize the 
larger picture of the information that has moved across the guard.  Researchers Swamy, Hicks 
and Tsang (2007) have advocated the dynamic association of security labels with sensitive 
entities.  The authors admit though that several technical challenges remain before this can be 
enabled: 
a. A language must be designed to produce labels capable of supporting common 
security policies; 
b. We should be able to precisely track the labels as a file is moved through different 
applications; 
c. Consistent security policy checks should take place within applications; and  
d. As documents (with their embedded labels) are moved across the network, the 
relationship between object and label should not be misconstrued. 
In summary, a number of available and accredited solutions have been produced by both 
US and UK companies that could be used to provide CDS to nations seeking to reduce their 
existing air-gaps with the NATO classified LAN MINERVA.  Limitations in their deployment 
and operation exist, but they do offer a more reliable, trusted solution, and should improve the 
overall consultation process. 
Chapter 7 – The Quest for Multi-Level Security (MLS)  
 
Government agencies and contractors have been interested and working towards 
developing MLS solutions since the mid-sixties.  In 1973, the Bell-LaPadula model was defined 
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to formalize the US DoD’s MLS policy and helps to narrow discussion on this potentially wide-
ranging subject.  The Bell-LaPadula model concentrates on confidentiality aspects of information 
and defines two important security axioms (“Bell-LaPadula model”, n.d.): 
a. A subject cannot read information for which it is not cleared, often referred to as no 
read-up; and  
b. A subject cannot move information from system-high to system-low, often referred to 
as no write-down. 
An apparent limitation of the Bell-LaPadula model is its focus on information 
confidentiality, neglecting to consider the integrity of the information. The Biba integrity Model 
attempts to address this limitation by defining the following security axioms: 
a. A subject may modify an object if the security level of a subject is at least as high as 
the security level of the object; and 
b. A system-low object may not be passed to a system-high object. This prevents the 
corruption of system-high information by system-low information. 
The Data Diodes discussed in a previous chapter are certainly MLS products, and 
precisely follow the Bell LaPadula tenets of no read-up and no write-down.  The DII High 
Assurance Guard CDS discussed in the previous chapter can also be described as an MLS 
product, but it does not strictly subscribe to Bell LaPadula or Biba security models since it does 
permit write-down.  Multi-Domain Security (MDS) has been suggested as the logical evolution 
of the technology, aiming to meet the demands of customers that are well aware of what 
capabilities exist in other domains - most commonly the Internet (“Multi-Domain Security and 
its Impact on Network Centric Operations”, n.d.).  In reality, users have become very 
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accustomed to using Google and weblogs (blogs) for problem solving and analysis at home, and 
they can’t understand why these tools are not commonly available on classified networks. 
The US DoD has ambitions of creating a Global Information Grid (GIG), replacing the 
current stovepipes and inherent disadvantages of modern information systems by 2020.  The GIG 
will be based on the utility of web services and IP, using COTS hardware and software but 
running over a black or protected core (Reed, 2004).  This black-core network will require 
encryption of all data at source, based on SSL/TLS (or its successor) – and this remains “a key 
challenge for network architecture” (Mineweaser, 2006).  The expectation with the GIG is that 
classified material from any source may be available all over the network, but only accessible to 
qualified/legitimate users. 
At least three different MLS approaches have been taken to provide high assurance to 
MLS architectures.  The systems contain some similarities in their construct, but it has been 
proven difficult to compare them, without “metrics or even a common framework for 
understanding the relative security characteristics of the different approaches” (Levin, Irvine, 
Weissman, and Nguyen, 2007, p.37).  Levin et al compared the Evaluated Policy architecture 
(used in XTS-400) based on a security kernel, Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) 
based on a basic separation kernel and the Least Privilege architecture based on Separation 
Kernel Protection Profile.  Figure 10, on the following page, illustrates a current example of the 
MILS architecture with the Trusted Services Engine (TSE), a Government Off-the-Shelf (GOTS) 
open source cross-domain file/web server (under development for the US Navy).  
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Figure 10: Trusted Services Engine (TSE) Architecture (McNamee et al, 2006) 
The TSE is based on the MILS architectural concept and is targeted for EAL6 
accreditation.  Together with the developmental Multilevel Document Collaboration Server 
(DocServer), the TSE is expected to permit true cross-domain documents collaboration.  Users 
will connect to a single virtual combined file and web server, where they may browse, open, edit 
and save documents, using available COTS editors, for example, Word 2003. The DocServer 
will allow XML documents stored on the file/web server to contain regions marked with varying 
sensitivity level annotations. This is expected to provide a secure execution environment and safe 
access to multi-level document storage, mediating between user workstations and multi-level 
document storage to ensure that multiple users can collaborate safely and securely on documents 
with information marked to different levels of security (McNamee et al, 2006). Since the TSE is 
consistent with the GIG roadmap, the DocServer application and concept is one that may support 
a smooth transition from multiple separate networks (the current MLS environment) to the future 
GIG and black core network.  Figure 11, below, illustrates the publish, edit and merge workflow 
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processes of the DocServer.  In this example, an originator chooses to publish a document 
containing Secret material to an unclassified site.  The DocServer filters the document, 
publishing the content – less the classified material.  All users are able to edit the document, 
based on what they have been allowed to see, with a subsequent merge containing all 
amendments downstream.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: DocServer Workflow Processes (McNamee et al, 2006) 
 
The TSE enforces the information flow envisioned by the Bell-LaPadula model, where 
users can read at their own level and lower, but can only write within their own level.  The 
capability for read-down should eliminate the need for lower classified data to clutter the higher 
level’s space, reducing storage requirements, making searches easier and reducing human error 
(McNamee et al, 2006). 
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Unfortunately, the promise of the GIG, a black-core network and MILS architecture 
solutions are essentially unavailable for implementation today.  Tremendous inroads have been 
made in the past decade, but technology and accreditation still lag behind the demand. 
Chapter 8 – Building Upon Current Technology  
 
Proven and Available Technology 
Starting with the realistic assumption that every nation has access to the Internet, either 
through a firewall on one of its own Intranets or through an independent Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) at the Delegation, one may question how this could be leveraged to support the 
consultation process.  In fact, many of the Committees and Working Groups that make up the 
NATO Committee structure are already using the Internet to work on unclassified documents 
placed on Internet portals.  NATO presence on the Internet does not reveal anything in the way 
of its web server’s capability, but high availability and assurance are hampered, pending a 
significant technology refresh (currently under consideration at NATO HQ).  Trusted 
authentication and access control mechanisms are commercially available, albeit they may be 
time consuming to setup and modify in consideration of the complicated committee structure 
(Warner, Atluri and Mukkamala, 2007).  Without the use of HTTPS (based on AES, the accepted 
standard for protecting up to Secret data) (“Committee on National Security Systems”, 2003) this 
contribution to the business process will be limited to unclassified material – at least in the 
coming year or two.  Given that 85% of MINERVA traffic is classified as NR and below, the use 
of Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Security Layer (SSL/TSL) to secure web transactions should 
be seen as a potentially significant contributor to the business process, and its implementation 
and investment should proceed without delay.  An appropriately constructed Internet presence 
   
   
Information Sharing Solutions   56 
 
 
 
should also enable the use of email, chat and streaming live video (of high level conferences) 
through the secure site – and should not be limited to only web pages. 
The protection of higher classified material with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) could 
result in an evolutionary improvement, but considerable work would need to be done to establish 
the required hierarchy, something that NATO has been considering for several years in order to 
establish a common robust military messaging system.  Any organization that wishes to embrace 
PKI will need an entity that (Ciampa, 2005, p. 317): 
a. Issues digital certificates to users and servers; 
b. Provides software that integrates with applications;  
c. Integrates all corporate certificate directories; and 
d. Manages, renews and revokes certificates. 
The use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) is another area that warrants consideration.  
A VPN would allow users to establish a protected tunnel from their workplace to a NATO 
network, at the NR or below level (this would be more difficult to accept for an NC or NS 
network). However, the bane of VPNs is the potential for an unprotected back door to the 
Internet, exposing the network to the threat of malicious code.  Clients configured for VPN 
should be “clamped down” so that a user is not able to access the Internet concurrently, through a 
second network connection – preventing the condition known as split tunneling (Weaver, 2007, 
p. 205).    Normally, the protected network faces the Internet with its firewall, IDS, proxy 
servers, and DMZ.  To expose the network to the Internet through a split tunneled VPN 
connection would put it at risk.  While the use of VPNs established through office or home 
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desktop/laptop computers seems to be commonplace in industry, it is also common for the 
company that owns the network to own the hardware/software, or at least control the 
configuration and reduce corporate exposure.  Nations are not likely to permit NATO staff to 
install and configure VPN software on national platforms, for the purpose of reducing NATO 
risk – particularly when the same equipment needs to be configured for national purposes.  Also, 
national staff would not be interested in setting up a VPN to a NATO network unless they could 
do so in parallel with connection to one or more of their own national networks, an obviously 
risky situation.  
Coalition Technology Demonstrations and Exercises 
Exercise Combined Endeavor and Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 
(CWID) provide NATO nations and partners annual opportunities to test current and emerging 
solutions to address interoperability challenges.  Interoperability is certainly a dynamic field, 
changing every year as nations replace legacy systems and bring into service new equipment. 
From 2006 onwards, CWID was hosted outside the Continental US, and focused on forward 
deployments and multi-partner coalitions.  Many nations conduct exercises focusing on net-
centric operations and multi-national coalition sharing through secure networks (“Global 
Connections - Coalition Partner Sites”, n.d.). 
At the May 2007 version of Exercise Combined Endeavor, cooperation between The 
Netherlands and Canada resulted in the design and test of an Interface Gateway Box (IGB) 
between the two nations (Lourens, 2007).  The approach used was to configure a TACOMS Post 
2000 (agreed NATO Standard) Interoperability Point (IOP) in order to enable data exchange 
between national domains for VOIP, a C2 Information System application (using only an agreed 
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common data model, but different nationally developed applications) and messaging services.  
This enabled telephone, email, C2 and chat services at the mission secret level between the two 
nations.  Using a common database repository, both nations were able to use their own national 
C2 application, eliminating any staff-training burden.   Future services planned for 2008 testing 
include web services and VTC.  The functionality of the IGB is best described as a service 
converter from national (proprietary) data formats to generic, standardized formats agreed by 
NATO and Coalition Communities of Interest.  Figure 12 describes the resultant functionality 
achieved through the configuration of the IGB concept, one for each nation (Lourens, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  Function Description of an IGB (Lourens, 2007) 
 
Coalition Secure Management and Operations System (COSMOS) 
COSMOS is another multinational effort (that includes some NATO nations, but some 
that are not with NATO) aimed to improve secure sharing of electronic data among coalition 
forces.  The COSMOS project is centered on setting up a Joint Task Force in a theater of 
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operations and “quickly enabling the sharing of essential information among the coalition 
partners” (Larsen, 2007).   At CWID 2007, a COSMOS solution was tested, building upon the 
use of the same common data model as mentioned in the preceding paragraph describing the IGB 
(“Coalition Secure management and Operations System (COSMOS) - Technical Interoperability 
Results”, n.d.).  The developed COSMOS Information Management Tool capabilities include 
“the creation, management, monitoring and control of information-sharing across Coalition C2 
system boundaries” (“COSMOS Aims to Facilitate the Exchange of Data Among Allies”, n.d.). 
NATO Cooperative Zones 
The NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Agency (NC3A) has introduced 
the concept of combining symmetric Cooperative Zones to form Information Exchange 
Gateways (IEG) (Diepstraten and Parker, 2003).  This concept addresses the author’s concerns 
expressed at Chapter 6 vis-à-vis ownership, physical placement and configuration control of the 
DMZ and BPS components.  From an operational point of view, the NC3A characterizes an IEG 
by two distinguishing features: 
a. Information services that pass through the gateway (mail, web, VTC, VOIP as well as 
management services such as simple network management protocol (SNMP) and 
domain name service (DNS)); 
b. The difference in security domains (which can lead to developing gateways to 
accommodate NATO nations, and also non-NATO nations and NGOs). 
The different security domains have led to the development of different “cases” or 
“scenarios” depending on what the network security classification is, and who operates and 
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manages it (“Information Exchange Gateway”, n.d.).  Case B is where NATO nations connect 
their networks to the NS WAN.  The Cooperative Zone architecture resembles a “screened 
subnet firewall configuration based on a bastion host that provides authentication and proxy 
services” (Diepstraten and Parker, 2003, p.2).  The Cooperative Zone DMZ is insulated through 
two Boundary Protection Devices (BPD).  Figure 13 depicts the deployment of the NC3A IEG 
concept using security and proxy functions established in the Cooperative Zone.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  IEG concept with security and proxy functions established in the Cooperative Zone. 
(“NATO C3 Technical Architecture”, 2005, p.8) 
“National systems communicate with NATO via corresponding proxy functions in the 
Cooperative Zone LAN.  The proxy function again communicates with the corresponding NATO 
system or another nation’s proxy across the NS WAN” (“NATO C3 Technical Architecture”, 
2005, p.7).  Inside the Cooperative Zone there should be at least a DNS server, Directory Service 
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Agent (DSA), and Military Messaging Handling Server (MMHS).  The intention is that NATO 
nations will connect to Regional Gateways containing Cooperative Zones (“Information 
Exchange Gateway”, n.d.).  Nations will be responsible for the costs of the National BPD and 
Cooperative Zone LAN, although NATO will be responsible for the NATO BPD and 
configuration and operation of the LAN services.  Nations will also not be restricted in their 
selection of the National BPD, which could be an IDS or even a full CDS, as described at 
Chapter 6.  A Cooperative Zone has also been described as essentially “an extended border 
protection device, providing application proxies as well as firewall capability and IDS” (Parker, 
2005, p.8).  The IEG concept has been developed and tested, and a contract has been awarded to 
construct the backbone of Regional gateways where nations may be able connect.  This Regional 
gateway construct is consistent with the US view of CENTRIXS expansion, to include 
connections to NATO and member nations (Parker, 2005). 
In summary, several alternative solutions for connecting different networks together in a 
trusted environment have already been tested on exercises and demonstrations.  This cycle of 
configuration and testing will continue to contribute to the realization of emerging commercial 
products, eventually replacing the CDS described in Chapter 6.  The NATO architecture of 
Regional IEGs and Cooperative Zones recognizes the requirement for interconnection with 
national networks, and in time, may result in a significant reduction in air-gaps, experienced both 
in the HQ and tactical environment.  Improved availability and assurance by leveraging Internet 
transport solutions and the use of SSL/TLS will also improve the consultation process. 
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Chapter 9 – Findings and Analysis  
 
The author’s experience working at NATO HQ gave rise to the knowledge of an 
information exchange problem, detracting from the key business process of consensus building.  
Following a comprehensive literature review and research period, including consultations with 
key staff, it is apparent that technological solutions are available.  The different potential 
solutions are briefly described in the following paragraphs. 
Data Diodes 
At this time, the use of one-way Data Diodes has been limited to moving data from 
system low to system high networks.  Since the consultation process depends on the exchange of 
information, although the utility of Data Diodes cannot be dismissed, this one-way transfer 
hampers their potential contribution to the business process.  However, at least one vendor (Fort 
Fox) is working on a two-way Data Diode, effectively with the inclusion of a supervisor 
responsible to vet material that moves down to the lower network.  The pending successful 
accreditation and installation of this device could make a noticeable contribution to the 
consultation process.  With a two-way Data Diode, data could be securely moved and logged 
between the current NATO MINERVA LAN and national networks, at practically any level. 
Cross-Domain Security Guards 
Several accredited CDS exist in both the North American and European markets.  Despite 
their inherent limitations, they are the only current technological solution that can provide 
regulated and secure information transfer across networks.  Since the expansion of CENTRIXS 
has envisaged a NATO variant, it is only a matter of time before this solution is available, and 
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ready for nations to connect with the NS WAN - consistent with the NATO IEG architecture.  
When CENTRIXS is ready, nations would be wise to connect with it. 
MLS 
When accredited, true MLS should go a long way to satisfy the problem expressed in this 
paper concerning air-gaps between networks.   The concept of discovery will play an important 
aspect in advancing meaningful sharing amongst coalition partners.  This is consistent with the 
vision for transition to a Web Services and Semantic Web environment (Reed, 2004).  The GIG 
vision for a black core network, allowing virtually any classified data to be transported to any 
destination sounds very promising, but unfortunately, this technology is not currently available, 
and may not be for many several years. 
Use of the Internet 
Security rules governing the handling and storage of NR and below data are quite relaxed 
in comparison with those governing NC and above.  NATO HQ is currently studying the 
potential benefits of configuring and installing a Business LAN at the NR level, running in 
parallel with MINERVA (at the NS level) – as a result of the revealing statement that 85% of 
MINERVA data is classified at NR and below.  If the deployment of this Business LAN is done 
in conjunction with a significant technology refresh for the NATO presence on the Internet (to 
include sufficient availability and security with SSL/TLS), nations may be well poised to take 
advantage of this – both in the Delegations on site in Brussels as well as in the national capitals.  
Banking and financial institutions have been making use of HTTPS for several years, and this 
technology is well suited to revitalizing the consultation process.  Investment at NATO HQ itself 
and its Internet presence would result in this improvement, with no subsequent required 
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investment on the national side.  This assumes that nations have adequate Internet access, either 
through an ISP or firewalls on their Intranets.  However, this would then set the conditions for 
split information storage, compared to the current system high method of storage on a DMS. 
As a technology, VPN is an enabler when used on national and NATO networks - 
tunneling through the Internet.  However, in order to be of any practical advantage to national 
staff members that are trying to exchange information with NATO and capital staff, they need to 
be able to work with at least two networks at one time.  Unfortunately, this will setup the 
undesirable condition of split tunneling, not allowed by most security policies – and diminishing 
the practicality of using VPN. 
Project Summery 
In summary, this project fully met the goals of describing the information exchange 
problem and prescribing incremental solutions based on research and literature review.  Since the 
business process is so dependent upon the success of consultation and the achievement of full 
consensus among members, even the lack of participation of a single member nation will be seen 
to hinder success.  Additionally, even with the full cooperation of all nations, although most 
technological solutions will be helpful, improvements to the consultation process will be difficult 
to measure. 
By drawing attention to the requirement to embrace technological solutions, this paper 
should be of interest to NATO HQ staff and NATO member nations, reflecting on the obvious 
potential for immeasurable added value to the business process.  Follow-on work may delve into 
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describing a solution for a highly available and secure NATO Internet presence, citing firewall, 
DMZ and IP addresses in detail. 
Chapter 10 - Conclusions  
 
The proliferation of stove-piped networks over the past decade has contributed to the 
increase in network air-gaps or sneaker-nets.  National staff working at NATO HQ are routinely 
required to review and sift data originating on either NATO or national networks and move it 
across domain boundaries – in support of the business process.  This business process depends 
on the efforts and success of individual staff members in order to review documents, and consult 
with their national subject matter experts with the aim of achieving 100% consensus amongst 
Alliance members.  This paper confirmed that a significant information exchange problem exists 
at NATO HQ detracting from the key business process of building consensus.   
Following a literature review and period of research, it has been determined that solutions 
to mitigate the negative consequences of air-gaps are at hand, but NATO and nations need to 
embrace them on an incremental basis.   Unfortunately, since lack of consensus can ultimately be 
attributed to even a single nation, all NATO members need to adopt the attitude of duty-to-share, 
vice need-to-know, which has existed as the predominate modus operandi for decades.  Both 
nations and NATO staff need to consider and adopt solutions resulting from risk management, 
vice risk avoidance.  Additionally, although options for MLS seem to be on the horizon, the 
length of time to achieve accreditation cannot be dismissed, and it is not recommended to wait 
for these products to reach maturity before taking action.   
As an immediate measure, NATO HQ should improve its presence on the Internet, 
building on the desired tenets of availability and security.  This should allow staff working either 
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at NATO HQ or national capitals the flexibility of downloading and uploading NATO 
documents classified at NR and below over the Internet in a secure fashion.  The implementation 
of CDS between national classified networks and the NS WAN, when supported by CENTRIXS, 
should also result in noticeable improvements.  Additional work, if required, could delve into the 
architectural details of an improved NATO Internet presence, embracing available and secure 
technology that has been in common use in the banking industry for more than a decade. 
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the use of Information Exchange Gateways (IEG) based on a set of cooperative zones at 
NATO facilities exchanging information using agreed services with member Nations and 
elements of the NATO command structure.  NATO networks are currently in an 
evolutionary change mode, as they continue to be updated and expanded, with a view to 
increasing interoperability with Nations.  There are currently no interfaces between the 
NATO Secret WAN and the USA classified networks, although a connection with 
CENTRIXS is envisaged through a NATO Regional IEG. 
 
Phillips, C., Ting, T., Demurjian, S., (June 2002) Information sharing and security in dynamic 
coalitions. SACMAT '02: Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Access 
control models and technologies.  Retrieved on 21 January 2008 from: 
http://portal.acm.org.dml.regis.edu/citation.cfm?id=507726&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFI
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D=50950228&CFTOKEN=74772502 
This paper highlights the well documented need to accommodate information sharing on-
site (ie, in a tactical environment) within a coalition of different nations, military, civilian 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) formed in international operations.  In 
practice, this is much more difficult to achieve than static interoperability at NATO HQ, 
since the composition of the coalition is dynamic and includes NGOs.   The paper defines 
and uses the terms Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control 
(DAC) and Role-based Access Control (RBAC), touching on the potential requirement 
for time-based access as well. 
 
Prague Summit Declaration. 21-22 November 2002. NATO Press Release.  Retrieved on 26 
January 2008 from: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm 
The Prague Summit of November 2002 was the first of many summits where NATO 
declared the importance of transforming to adopt new structures, procedures and 
technologies to counter the new asymmetric threat of terrorism.  This particular Summit, 
is the basis for modern transformation within NATO, following the dissolution of the 
USSR. 
 
Press Release – Accreditation of Email Transfer and Data Forwarding Applications Results in 
Complete Turn-Key Cross Domain Solution.  (n.d.) Retrieved on 17 January 2008 from:  
www.tenixamerica.com/07_Accreditation_2.html 
Tenix America is another producer of a hardware Data Diode, using fiber optic.  This 
article touts full accreditation of Tenix America’s 100MB Data Diode.  The Diode’s 
Email Transfer Application and Data Forwarding Application were evaluated on their 
ability to mitigate security threats in three areas of concern: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability.  Tenix offers an Enterprise solution that incorporates: one-way email, one-
way file transfer, one-way transfer of IP packets and one-way transfer of clipboard data.  
The clipboard data feature is especially interesting. 
 
Reed, N.,  (2004) Security Guards for the Future Web Final Project Report.  Mitre Center for 
Integrated Intelligence System.  1-18, Colorado Springs, Colorado.  
This report details research during 2003/2004 into three potential areas for future security 
guards for future web traffic: a Browser-based environment (essentially today’s 
environment), a Web Services environment, and a Semantic Web environment.  It 
provides a good explanation of what constitutes commonly available security guards.  It 
explores the near-term potential with XML guards, although not yet commercially 
available. 
 
RFC 2828 - Internet Security Glossary.  (n.d.) Retrieved on 15 January 2008 from: 
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2828.html 
This Glossary provides abbreviations, explanations, and recommendations for the use of    
information system security terminology. (detailed in 191 pages of definitions and 13 
pages of references) 
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Roberston, G.  (2004) Transforming NATO to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century.  
Transatlantic Transformation: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century, Washington, DC, 
Center for Transatlantic Relations, 30. 
The former Secretary General of NATO made some strong comments on the challenges 
of transforming NATO. 
 
SecureOffice Trusted Gateway on Linux.  (n.d.) Retrieved on 28 January 2008 from: 
http://www.tcs-sec.com/products/TrustedGatewayLinux.html  
Trusted Computer Systems offers a cross-domain solution built on a Linux server 
platform, the first secure Linux operating system to enter evaluation at EAL4.  This 
builds upon the Trusted Gateway System (TGS), fielded and operational for more than 
ten years.  This solution can be used with Unix clients, or on Windows 2000 or above.  It 
is not limited to any arbitrary combination of networks (could be used as 26:1 with 
NATO HQ for example), and provides secure, multi-directional data transfer using a 
graphical, web-based client interface.  It has options for dirty word search and two-person 
review (originator and reviewer) when moving data from a high to lower classification.  
Users are able to request data movement in any direction, based on their security 
clearance, site security policies and user access rights. 
 
Shehab, M., Bertino, E., Ghafoor, A., (November 2005) Secure collaboration in mediator-free 
environment. CCS '05: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and 
communications security. ACM.  Retrieved on 22 January 2008 from: 
http://delivery.acm.org.dml.regis.edu/10.1145/1110000/1102130/p58-
shehab.pdf?key1=1102130&key2=2786401021&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFID=5109783
8&CFTOKEN=98148372 
This article is hardly relevant, but does point out that despite the advances of the Internet 
(which has made multi-domain collaboration a reality), the lack of interoperation between 
domain access control policies may give way to security breaches. The authors have 
promoted a framework where the user's access path is used to provide domains with 
sufficient information to enable secure access control decisions.  They also advocated a 
path authentication scheme providing increased security to the path as it moves through 
domains. 
 
Silberglitt, R., AntÃ³n, P., Howell, D., Wong, A. (2006) The Global Technology Revolution 
2020, In-Depth Analyses. Copyright © 2006 RAND Corporation.  
It is useful to extract a few comments from this study that speak to the potential 
institutional difficulties in implementing new technologies.  NATO member nations are 
on their own recognizance when it comes to implementation.  There may be drivers or 
barriers that come to play, certainly impacting on the Alliance as a whole. 
 
Swamy, N., Hicks, M., Tsang, S., (October 2007) Verified Enforcement of Security Policies for 
Cross-Domain Information Flows. Proceedings of the 2007 Military Communications 
Conference (MILCOM), Retrieved on 21 January 2008 from: 
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http://www.cs.umd.edu/~nswamy/papers/cpa-milcom07.pdf  
The downside of typical cross domain guards is that content checkers may be too rigid 
(inhibiting information sharing) in their enforcement of the cross domain security policy.  
Alternatively, they may be too permissive and not able to realize the larger picture of the 
information that has moved across the guard.  The authors advocate a framework of 
dynamic association between security labels (using SELinks metadata) and sensitive 
objects.  Much more work has yet to be done to industrialize this concept. 
 
Tenix Data Diode – Absolute Information Protection.  (n.d.) Retrieved on 10 February 2008 
from: 
http://www.tenixamerica.com/products.html 
This is the Tenix America site for public information on its Data Diode product.  General 
product requirements and technical specifications are available for the Interactive Link 
Data Diode, one-way email transfer, one-way data transfer, one-way data and clipboard 
transfer.  The products are accredited for use in government applications. 
 
The Consultation Process - Reaching Consensus.  Retrieved on 26 January 2008 from: 
http://www.nato.int/issues/consultation/index.html 
 Continuous informal and formal dialogue is part of the consensus building process at 
NATO HQ.  Consultation and consensus have been a cornerstone of the business process 
at NATO HQ since the foundation of the Alliance in 1949. These working procedures are 
still in place. 
 
Thuppal, R., (12 December 2007) Comd-Net, SIGNET-C and ADM(POL) Information Exchange 
Gateway. vs0.72. DIMEI-8.  Canadian Department of National Defence. 
This unclassified document provides the design specification for the information 
exchanges between 3 classified networks (all at Secret level) but with different release 
caveats.  Two networks are designated Canadian Eyes Only (CEO), and the third network 
is designated Secret releasable Canada-United States.  The document provides a high-
level specification, based on defined web browsing activities (specifying which network 
can browse openly or specific web data within other sites) and the requirement for 
content checking of emails and attachments.  The firewall design is based on a hardware 
platform supplied by the Secure Computing Cyberguard TPS appliance.  Antivirus and 
content checking are to be done by the application Alladin eSafe v5.1 running on a DII 
Guard (based on current accreditation status). 
 
Thuppal, R., (31 October 2007) Interactive Link - System Design Specification.  vs0.13. DIMEI-
8. Canadian Department of National Defence. 
This unclassified document provides the design specification for the Interactive Link 
System - a capability to securely transfer data from a lower classified network to a higher 
classified network while preventing any possibility of data leakage.  It provides the high-
level and technical details to which the end system must conform.  The Interactive Link 
Keyboard Switch is most interesting since it allows users to securely access two separate 
networks from a single workstation, using thin client technology to display the less secure 
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network in a window on the secure PC.  Users can access email, web and public networks 
without compromising security and removes the purchase and running costs associated 
with the second PC.  One way transfer of emails, files and clipboard data is easily 
supported.  The Interactive Link software installs on the High Network and Low Network 
Diode Servers to coordinate data transfer.  In the document, Tenix Data Diode products 
are specified, together with EAL7 (Common Criteria) and E6 (ITSEC) accredited servers 
in order to provide the requisite high level of assurance (the design specification actually 
serves 3 networks: unclas/secret/TS). 
 
Trusted Solaris 8 Operating Environment. (n.d.) Retrieved on 24 January 2008 from: 
http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/trustedsolaris/features.xml 
This webpage describes Sun’s EAL4 evaluated operating system. 
 
Warner, J., Atluri, V., Mukkamala, R., Vaidya, J., (June 2007) Using semantics for automatic 
enforcement of access control policies among dynamic coalitions. SACMAT '07: 
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies. 
ACM.  Retrieved on 22 January 2008 from: 
http://delivery.acm.org.dml.regis.edu/10.1145/1270000/1266877/p235-
warner.pdf?key1=1266877&key2=3056401021&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFID=5109783
8&CFTOKEN=98148372 
The authors discuss a method to meet information sharing requirements for coalitions 
(emergency alliances, peace keeping, military, commercial ventures), but focus on the 
more difficult problem of dynamic coalitions - that may change frequently.  Web sharing 
can be done using traditional access control and authentication tools, but the initial 
workload of setting this up can become a burden.  Additionally, with a coalition, the 
necessary interactions may be short lived, and can change frequently.  Typical access 
control policies are based on "who", but the authors advocate an abstract definition of 
"who" in order to accommodate staffing changes within organizations. They propose a 
first step in automating Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), using semantics associated 
with the user and the user's role, and attributes found in existing information databases.  
This is work in progress, and not yet found in commercial applications. 
 
Weaver, R.,  (2007). Guide to Network Defense and Countermeasures.  Second Edition, 205,  
Thomson Course Technology. 
This is a core textbook for Regis University School for Professional Studies MSCT 672.   
 
Whitman, M.E and Mattord, H.J., (2005). Principals of Information Security. Second Edition, 
68-385, Thomson Course Technology.  
This is a core textbook for Regis University School for Professional Studies MSCT 670.  
It surveys the discipline of information security, and provides an introduction to both 
security management and technical aspects. 
 
XTS-400  -  BAE Systems.  (n.d.) Retrieved on 21 January 2008 from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XTS-400 
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The XTS-400 is a multi-level secure computer system, originally developed by BAE 
Systems, and supporting Gigabit Ethernet and both IPv4 and IPv6.  Its secure trusted 
operating system (STOP) is the only general purpose operating system to meet the 
Common Criteria EAL of 5 or above.  XTS-400 can host, and be trusted with separate 
networks - and is typically used in cross-domain solutions, guarding information flow 
between two or more networks of differing security characteristics - when used with a 
piece of privileged software. 
 
Zellmer, D., (26 March 2003). Multi-Level Security: Reality of Myth?  GSEC Practical 
Requirements v.1.4.b.  Retrieved on 23 January 2008 from: 
http://www.delmar.edu/Courses/ITSC1347/eBooks/Multi-Level_Security(Reality-or-
Myth).pdf 
The author retains full rights of this document.  Although it has been read, it has not been 
used as a reference.   
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
A Ampere 
ACL Access Control List 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
AUS Australia 
BICES Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System 
BPD Boundary Protection Device 
BPS Boundary Protection Service 
CD Compact Disc 
CDS Cross Domain Solution 
CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System 
CIO Chief Information Officer 
COSMOS Coalition Secure Management and Operations System 
COTS Commercial-Off-the-Shelf 
C2 Command and Control 
CWID Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 
DAC Discretionary Access Control 
DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directives 
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade 
DII Defense Information Infrastructure 
DISA Defense Information System Agency 
DMS Document Management System 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone 
DND Department of National Defence (Canada) 
DNS Domain Name Service 
DoD Department of Defense (USA) 
DSA Directory Service Agent 
DVD Digital Video Disc 
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
ETA Email Transfer Application 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FTP File Transport Protocol 
GBR Great Britain 
GIG Global Information Grid 
GOTS Government Off-the-Shelf 
HQ Headquarters 
HTTP Hypertext Transport Protocol  
HTTPS Hypertext Transport Protocol Over Secure Socket Layer 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IEG Information Exchange Gateway 
IFOR Implementation Force 
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IGB Interface Gateway Box  
IL-DD Interactive Link Data Diode 
IOP Interoperability Point 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6 
ISO International Standards Organisation 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
IT Information Technology 
JCOP Joint Common Operational Picture 
.jpg A file compression format (Joint Photographic Compression) 
K Thousand (metric) 
KW kilowatt 
LAN Local Area Network 
MAC Mandatory Access Control 
MB megabyte 
MC Military Committee 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MILS Multiple Independent Levels of Security 
MINERVA not an acronym, but a LAN used at NATO HQ 
MLS Multi-level Security 
MMHS Military Messaging Handling Server 
MoD Ministry of Defence (UK or generic) 
MDS Multi-Domain Security 
NAC North Atlantic Council 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NC NATO Confidential 
NCW Network Centric Warfare 
NC3A NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Agency 
NEC Network Enabled Capability 
NEW Network Enabled Warfare 
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations 
NR NATO Restricted 
NS NATO Secret 
NSA National Security Agency 
NLZ New Zealand 
PC Personal Computer 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
RBAC Role-based Access Control 
SAGE Standard Automated Guard Environment 
SIPRNet Secret IP Router Network 
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol  
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SQL Formerly known as Structured English Query Language (SEQUEL) 
SSL/TLS Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Security Layer 
STOP Secure Trusted Operating System 
TGS Trusted Gateway System 
TS Top Secret 
TSE Trusted Services Engine 
UK United Kingdom 
USA United States of America 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialists Republic 
VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol 
VPN Virtual Private Networks 
VTC Video Teleconference 
WAN Wide Area Network 
 
   
   
